ADR-0063: Compliance lives in programs, never in inclusion
Regulated users ask a Layer 2 for two things a public chain does not give them: who may transact (KYC, allow lists, sanctions screening) and who may see…
Status: accepted (accepted, , by the owner ("accept ADR-0006 and ADR-0063")). Dated 2026-11-19.
Status: accepted, 2026-11-19, by the owner ("accept ADR-0006 and ADR-0063"). Written the same day at the owner's request, after the site's "Why a Layer 2" section promised that compliance lanes would be decided "in a public decision record before any such lane is offered". This is that record. Design only: nothing here is built, compiled or deployed, no chain changes, and no identity system of any kind exists. It narrows docs/vision/multi-vertical-svm-l2.md §4.3 ("institutional cloak gates") and answers the open row in that document's §5.3.
1. Context
Regulated users ask a Layer 2 for two things a public chain does not give them: who may transact (KYC, allow lists, sanctions screening) and who may see (private balances and order flow).
Solieum already makes a promise that both requests collide with. Forced inclusion (ADR-0009, the inbox) means anyone can put a transaction on the chain through Solana. The inbox fixes a deadline on-chain for every entry and faults the chain if an entry is left behind, and the node drains it every block. That is what makes the exit unstoppable: a user whose transactions the sequencer refuses can still withdraw.
1.1 What exists today
Checked against the records, so nothing is assumed:
| Piece | State | Source |
| Identity, KYC or credential system | None, of any kind | vision §5.3 |
| Forced-inclusion inbox | Live on devnet; deposits ride it | ADR-0009 |
| Execution at admission | Built: a transaction that would fail is refused free, before it is ordered | ADR-0014 |
| Programs a chain runs | Fixed by the operator at genesis; there is no deploy transaction | ADR-0019 |
| One-step fraud proof | Explicit classes only (system and SPL-token transfers, fees, deposits, withdrawals, account create and empty). Any other program's step is StepNotExecutable and not yet trustlessly disputable; the SBF interpreter that would cover it is started, not finished | ADR-0008 |
| Token deposits through the portal | Not credited | ADR-0009 |
| Private transactions | None. Every batch's data is published on Solana | ADR-0001 |
1.2 Where a gate can sit
| Option | What happens to forced inclusion |
| A. The sequencer and the inbox refuse unverified senders | Gone. The exit now depends on someone's allow list. The rollup becomes a permissioned chain that settles on Solana. |
| A′. The sequencer screens; the inbox stays open | Kept, but the screen is theatre: a refused sender pays the inbox fee and arrives a deadline later. Honest users pay more and wait longer; nobody is actually kept out. |
| B. A separate chain with its own genesis, portal and gate | The public rollup is untouched. The permissioned chain needs its own answer for exits. |
| C. The programs. An app's program checks a credential before it acts | Untouched. Every sender reaches the chain; the app's program decides what it will do for them. |
On privacy, ADR-0001 publishes every batch's data on Solana, and the fraud proof needs that data. A lane that withholds transaction data is a validium, and the brochure already says Solieum is not one.
2. Decision
D1. Inclusion is never permissioned on the public rollup. The sequencer orders, and the inbox accepts, any transaction that pays its fee, from any sender. No credential check is ever added to admission, the inbox, the portal's deposit path or the withdrawal proof. Options A and A′ are rejected (§5).
D2. Compliance on the public rollup is a program rule (option C). An app that must restrict who uses it does so in its own program: an allow list, or a credential account the program reads before it acts. The check reads only on-chain state, so every honest node computes the same answer. An unverified sender is never shut out of the chain, only out of that app:
- through the sequencer, the transaction fails at admission and is refused free (ADR-0014), as any failing transaction is;
- through the inbox, it is included, the program refuses it, and the sender has paid the inbox fee, as any forced transaction does.
Two limits apply, and every app page states them:
- The program must be in the chain's program set. A chain runs only the programs fixed at its genesis (ADR-0019), so a compliance program arrives on the public rollup only through that set, never by a deploy.
- The check is only as disputable as the program is. Until the SBF one-step verifier covers general programs (ADR-0008), a step inside an app's program is opaque to the dispute game, the credential check included. A Solieum page may not say a compliance rule is "enforced by fraud proofs" before then.
D3. A permissioned chain is allowed only as a separate, labelled chain (option B), and permission may limit what an account can do, never whether it can leave. Withdrawing funds an account already holds stays forceable through that chain's inbox with no credential check, and the operator cannot freeze an exit. If a customer's regulator requires the operator to freeze exits, that chain is not a Solieum rollup: it is described, on its own front page, as a permissioned sidechain that settles on Solana.
D4. No personal data goes on chain. A credential is an attestation from an off-chain issuer (a KYC provider, or a zero-knowledge credential such providers issue). On chain it is a salted commitment and a flag, never a name, document, date of birth or country. The salt is the holder's, so the commitment cannot be linked across apps or reversed by guessing; this matters because a chain cannot erase anything, and an unsalted hash of personal data can itself be personal data. The issuer's key is a trust assumption: every app that uses one names it and says how it is rotated (ADR-0027 is the pattern).
D5. Asset-level controls are the asset's, and are disclosed. A token issuer's freeze authority limits that token, not the chain, and is consistent with D2. It must be named on the app's page, because a frozen token account cannot move, out of the chain included. It never extends to SOL, and never to the portal. Token deposits are not credited today (ADR-0009), so this applies to tokens minted on the L2 only.
D6. Private transactions are out of scope. Batch data stays on Solana (ADR-0001). Hiding amounts or counterparties needs encrypted state or validity proofs that do not exist here (ADR-0062 is a draft). Until a record decides otherwise, Solieum offers commitments, as AI Control does (a hash on chain, the content off it), and nothing more.
D7. What may be said publicly. Until an app on Solieum enforces a credential under D2, every page says "not built". The words "ZK-KYC", "cloak gate" and "permissioned lane" are not used in the present tense, and no page says a compliance rule is enforced by fraud proofs before D2's second limit is lifted.
3. What has to be built, in order
Nothing below is scheduled. It is the order the decision implies.
- A credential-check template for app programs: reads a credential account, checks issuer and expiry, refuses otherwise. Solve · Cradle is the natural home, so a builder does not hand-write it.
- One issuer integration, chosen by its own decision record (§7).
- The program set entry for the first app that uses it, under ADR-0019's genesis rules, with its page naming the issuer and the freeze authority if any.
- General one-step verification (ADR-0008's SBF interpreter) before any claim that the rule is enforced by the dispute game.
- Only then a separate permissioned chain under D3, if a customer still needs one.
4. Consequences
- The censorship-resistance promise needs no footnote: whatever a program decides, every sender can reach the chain and every holder of SOL can leave it.
- Compliance moves into the app layer, where Solana developers already build it. Solieum ships no identity system of its own.
- The trust model gains nothing at the chain level. Each compliant app adds its own named assumptions: the issuer's key, the app's upgrade key and any freeze authority.
- An institution that wants a whole chain closed to outsiders gets one only under D3's exit rule, or as something Solieum does not call a rollup.
- The vision document's §4.3 and §5.3 now point here, and the site's "Compliance lanes" card and the brochure link to this record.
5. Why this way rather than the alternatives
- A (gate inclusion) buys a closed chain by spending the property every other record protects. ADR-0009 exists so that nobody can be excluded; a gate there makes the exit someone's permission.
- A′ (screen at the sequencer only) looks like a compromise and is the worst of the four: it costs honest users time and the inbox fee, stops nobody determined, and invites a page claiming a screen that does not hold.
- B alone would answer every request with a new chain, and leave the public rollup's apps with no way to serve regulated users at all.
- C keeps the chain neutral and puts the rule where the obligation is: on the app that has the regulated relationship.
6. What this does not decide
- Which issuer, credential format or zero-knowledge scheme (§7).
- Whether Solieum Labs runs a permissioned chain for anyone. D3 says what one must be, not that one will exist.
- Fees or pricing for compliant apps, which stay under ADR-0017 and ADR-0061.
- Anything about the order book or margin designs (vision §4.2, architecture prompt Appendix E), beyond that any gate in them is a program rule under D2.
7. Open questions
- Sanctions. Some jurisdictions require freezing a sanctioned address's funds. D3 forbids that for exits, and D5 allows it only for an issuer's own token. Counsel must say whether a chain under D3 can serve such customers at all.
- Revocation timing. D2's program reads the credential when the transaction executes, not when it was sent, so a credential revoked while a forced transaction waits in the inbox stops it. That needs confirming with an issuer as the behaviour they expect.
- Which issuer first, and how its key is rotated. A separate decision, and it names a trust assumption.
8. Not verified here
- That an SPL token's freeze authority behaves on Solieum as on Solana: the one-step verifier rejects frozen accounts rather than modelling them (ADR-0008), so a dispute over a step touching one is opaque today.
- Any measured cost for a credential check. None has been written.
9. Reversal triggers
- A validity-proof system (ADR-0002, ADR-0062) that can prove a hidden transaction correct would reopen D6.
- General one-step verification landing (ADR-0008) lifts D2's second limit; it changes what may be said (D7), not the decision.
- A regulator ruling that program-level checks (D2) are insufficient for a market Solieum wants would reopen D3, never D1.